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INVESTIGATING THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL REALM
OF BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY,




The fourth article of  this article series1 will conclude my investigations of  
the conditions of  biblical-theological methodology. After I introduced 
Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s critical analysis of  the human rational activity in 
the first two articles, the third article demonstrated the practical use of  their 
thinking, which deliver excellent frameworks of  analysis when methodological 
means and results of  applied methodologies are to be assessed. The final 
article will display limitations and problems in Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s 
thinking. This is a necessary step if  a fruitful dialogue between both thinkers 
should inspire a transformation of  their thinking and create even more clarity 
on the conditions of  biblical-theological methodology. This article will then 
begin by highlighting some critical elements in Canale’s phenomenology of  
Reason and Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique of  theoretical thought. The 
critique will then pass into reflections that suggest a transformation of  their 
analysis of  the human rational activity and improve our understanding of  the 
conditions of  biblical-theological methodology in specific.
4.1.2 Critique on Canale
Canale’s motivation to uncover the inner structure of  Reason and develop a 
biblical interpretation of  the dimensionality of  Reason has not yet led him to 
develop the ontological and epistemological frameworks. His dissertation did 
not attempt the establishment of  an entire philosophy, but only the laying-bare 
of  Reason’s structure and the exploration of  a biblically founded ontology in 
order to set the stage for a criticism of  theology. Because of  this, a criticism of  
Canale will be much more limited than a criticism of  Dooyeweerd. In general, 
there are only three areas in which one could criticize Canale’s thinking: his 
phenomenological analysis of  Reason; his criticism of  ancient and Western 
philosophy; and his interpretation of  Reason’s dimensionality in the light of  
Holy Scripture. 
In this final article, my criticism will focus only on Canale’s 
phenomenological analysis and his interpretation of  the biblical ground 
1Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological 
Methodology, Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 5-35; idem, 
“Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological Methodology, 
Part II: Canale on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 217-240; idem, “Investigating the 
Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological Methodology, Part III: Application 
and Comparison,” AUSS 48 (2010): 55-79.
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of  Being, with its subsequent consequences for a further interpretation of  
Reason’s frameworks.
4.1.2.1 Critiquing the Description of  the 
Phenomenological Structure of  Reason
4.1.2.1.1 Universalization of  Reason 
without Ontology?
From a Dooyeweerdian perspective, the central role of  Reason in Canale’s 
thinking is dubious. Dooyeweerdian thinking limits the rational realm to an 
aspect of  meaning-being. Doesn’t Canale absolutize Reason when he does not 
limit its scope? This question needs to be answered negatively. Canale’s use 
of  the term “Reason” as universalized Reason hinders the absolutization or 
autonomy of  rational thinking. Canale’s Reason does aspectualize components 
of  rational thinking. In this matter, it is important to acknowledge the different 
meaning Dooyeweerd and Canale attach to rational thinking. Canale does not 
use rational thinking in its narrow sense. To him, rational thinking cannot be 
reduced to mathematical-logical thinking.2 The critical question then remains 
to what extent it is legitimate to use the term “Reason” when the object of  
critical inquiry is that which enables the establishment of  Knowledge.3 Seeing 
the parallel between Canale’s Reason and Dooyeweerd’s knowledge, the 
universalization of  Reason should not be mistaken for an absolutization of  
reason in its classical sense. But how does Canale legitimize the universalization 
of  Reason without assuming a minimum of  ontological understanding? Is it 
possible to make analytic-logical thinking a part of  Reason’s whole without 
assuming an ontology? Canale claims that his analysis involves the onticity of  the 
phenomenon “Knowledge” (necessity of  a specific Being), but does not imply 
any specific logic of  the ontic. The onticity of  Knowledge can be interpreted 
both as timeless- and temporal-grounded. The unsolved question, however, is 
how a logical-analytic description of  the phenomenon of  Knowledge, i.e., its 
onticity, can avoid a specific Logos as Being. 
Because Canale claims that any logic receives its specific logical 
ground through an interpretation of  Being, one could conclude that the 
phenomenological analysis as phenomenological analysis includes a logos. 
However, this logos is not allowed to receive its specific logical ground through 
an interpretation of  Being if  its structural analysis of  the phenomenon of  
Reason wants to be of  universal character. This is contradictory as long as the 
2Oliver Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, 
Criticial Assessment, and Further Development of  Herman Dooyeweerd’s Structural 
Analysis of  Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale’s Phenomenological Analysis 
of  the Structure of  Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation” (Master’s Thesis, Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2006), 108.
3As far as I can see, the notion of  Reason focuses much more on the subject’s 
activity as contribution to the subject-object relation than the notion of  knowledge 
does.
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condition for the latter possibility is not clear. Canale does not, however, seem 
to recognize this tension in his phenomenological analysis. 
These critical remarks led my analysis to the conclusion that Canale’s 
phenomenological analysis of  Reason cannot claim to be purely descriptive 
or without ontological assumption, since he takes a specific philosophical 
standpoint at the very beginning of  his inquiry: universalized Reason and 
the possibility of  a neutral phenomenological logic that is not grounded in a 
specific Logos. His analysis builds upon this philosophical claim.
4.1.2.1.2 Meaning as Constituted by Reason
In Canale’s work, Reason is understood as the constitutive element of  any 
understanding.4 As far as I can see, this understanding can be problematic, 
depending on what Reason involves. Canale seems to introduce two slightly 
different understandings of  Reason. On the one hand, Reason is understood 
as “the human activity for the constitution of  meaning.”5 Here Reason is 
understood as an act of  the subject. This act, however, is of  universal 
character in the sense that it involves not only a human being’s analytic-logical 
cognition, but human consciousness in general. On the other hand, Reason 
is universalized in the sense of  all-encompassing humanity’s many aspects of  
knowing as subject and object.6 I assume that Canale’s first understanding 
of  Reason does not truly reflect his thinking, because it would contradict his 
entire analysis. These two different understandings can, however, be deduced 
from his work because of  his unclear definition of  Meaning: Meaning requires 
a subject-object relation, but the understanding and consciousness that flow 
out of  this relation as an expression of  Meaning is an action of  humanity 
alone. Thus the expression of  the Meaning flowing out of  the consciousness 
of  human experience of  the subject-object relation is a subjective action. In 
this sense, humans do generate Meaning as an expression or logical concept. 
However, the Meaning that flows out of  the subject-object relation is never 
identical with the expression or concept of  it. Expressed Meaning is, rather, a 
translation of  the subject’s insight (generated in the subject-object relationship) 
into a concept. Canale does not make this clear distinction between Meaning 
and the expression or concept of  Meaning. In my understanding, Canale 
focuses in his work on the phenomenological analysis of  the structure that 
enables an expressing and conceptualization of  Meaning rather than the 
structure that enables Meaning itself. Consequently, if  Canale’s claim that 
there is no Meaning outside of  human’s rational activity refers to the concept 
of  Meaning alone (understood in the wide sense as “humanity’s becoming 
conscious”), I agree with his understanding. 
4“Truth can be only that which is allowed by Reason and its particular categories” 
(Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial 
Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertations Series, 10 [Berrien 
Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987], 2).
5Ibid., 10.
6Ibid., 32.
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4.1.2.1.3 The Self  and Reason
In comparison with Dooyeweerd, there is no clear conception of  the subject 
as self  in Canale’s phenomenological analysis of  Reason. However, the 
phenomenological analysis of  the epistemological framework assumes a self, 
but is not concerned with its interpretation. Canale relegates the interpretation 
of  the self  to the ontological framework. The ontological concept of  the self  
is then assumed in the interpretation of  the epistemological framework. As 
Canale is only concerned with a structural and not an interpretational analysis 
of  Reason, he does not offer an interpretation of  the self, but emphasizes 
its existence as a formal part of  Reason. The formally required existence 
of  the subject is, however, characterized by the spontaneity that allows for 
the interpretation of  Reason’s structure, which emphasizes that the formal 
structure of  knowledge cannot constitute meaning because it is empty of  
concrete content (interpretation).
Dooyeweerd’s two ways of  transcendental critique lay bare the important 
role the self  plays in theoretical thinking. This discovery allowed for his persuasive 
critique on humanistic philosophy. The interpretation of  the self ’s origin as the 
foundation of  self-understanding functioned as hermeneutical horizon for any 
thought-act. Hereby the self  received its central role in Dooyeweerd’s analysis. 
In my opinion, it is a part of  the structure of  Reason that the ontic and the 
epistemic realms come together within the subject in a radical dependence 
on their common origin. I think Canale did not discover this structural given 
because he put emphasis on the interpretation of  Being rather than the choice 
of  a theos. The phenomenological analysis should have been able to show that 
self-understanding (belonging to the ontological-anthropological framework 
of  Reason), as dependent on an understanding of  the self ’s origin (theos or 
the One7), is a basic formal condition of  the structure of  Reason because the 
ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject. Consequently, an 
understanding of  the self, which is dependent on an understanding of  its origin, 
will have direct influence on the ontological and epistemological conceptions. 
Thus self-understanding, basically understood as an understanding of  one’s 
own being, will determine the epistemological categories of  the self, which 
are applied to all of  human cognition as hermeneutical guidelines. This formal 
interrelation, lacking in Canale’s work, would enrich his critical investigation of  
classical, modern, and postmodern thought.
Aside from the structural level, a biblical interpretation of  Reason must 
strongly address the self  of  humanity in the form of  the imago Dei and the 
biblical idea of  the heart or soul. Thus, although the self  and its formal 
relation with an understanding of  its origin should have been discovered 
in the phenomenological analysis, it can surely not be missed in the biblical 
interpretation of  Reason. Thus I conclude that both the phenomenological 
structure of  Reason and the biblical interpretation of  the structure of  
Reason call for an awareness of  the dependence of  self-understanding on an 
understanding of  the self ’s origin.
7Glanz, 58.
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4.1.2.1.4 Foundational Ontology and Transcendental Ideas
The comparison between the application of  Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s 
structural understanding in my earlier article8 has shown that Dooyeweerd’s 
transcendental idea of  origin is of  most practical value. This does not mean 
that the two thinkers contradict each other in regard to the central function 
of  the transcendental idea of  origin. I assume that as Canale was searching for 
the possibility of  a criticism of  theological thinking, foundational ontology 
played a much more important role in his investigation than the choice for 
theos, since most theologians accept God as the true origin of  all creation. 
His question was concerned much more with how it is possible that the same 
choice leads to different dogmatic beliefs, different explanations of  the relation 
between God and his creation, and different theological methodologies.9 
Here the dimensionality that is attributed to the chosen theos becomes most 
crucial. However, foundational ontology cannot determine the choice for a 
theos, but only the dimension in which the chosen theos is placed. Even 
though Canale did not focus on the choice for a theos, the theos clearly plays 
a crucial role in the variety of  philosophical and scientific ideologies (e.g., 
biologism, physicism, psychologism).
Foundational ontology cannot explain this important influence of  the 
theos, representing the ontic and noetic independence status, on theories and 
more specifically ontological and epistemological conceptions. Because the 
independence status, i.e., the idea of  origin in its noetic and ontic senses, 
plays such a determining role as direction-giver, especially in theoretical 
thinking,10 it does not seem to be a lucky choice of  terms to speak about 
the dimensionality of  Reason. It would make more sense to refer to Canale’s 
dimensionality of  Reason with another term that helps to clarify that man’s 
thinking is not just “dimensionalized” by the ground of  Being, but also by 
the choice for a theos. The dimension of  thinking is, then, determined by the 
ground of  Being and the chosen theos.
4.1.2.1.5 Abstract and Pre-theoretical Thinking
In Canale’s phenomenological analysis of  the structure of  Reason, he also 
refers to the terms “abstraction” and “pre-theoretical.”11 Although he 
does not make it explicit, these two terms, as belonging to the structure of  
Reason, need an interpretation in the course of  interpreting the frameworks 
of  Reason. Canale speaks vaguely of  abstract or theoretical knowledge as 
8Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-
Methodology, Part III: Application and Comparison,” AUSS 47 (2009): 217-240.
9Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological 
Methodology, Part II: Canale on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 217.
10See Roy A. Clouser, The Myth of  Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role 
of  Religious Belief  in Theories, rev. ed. (Notre Dame: University of  Notre Dame Press, 
2005), 9-87.
11Canale, 27, n. 4.
262 Seminary StudieS 48 (autumn 2010)
the place where the systematization of  Knowledge (Reason’s frameworks) 
is technically made explicit so that it can become a foundation and tool for 
science and philosophy. In contrast, in the pretheoretical attitude of  the 
human thought-act Reason’s system remains implicit and hidden. Therefore, 
the pretheoretical attitude is not a part of  the noncognitive realm, but rather 
points to the naively experienced subject-object relation. This pretheoretical 
cognitive experience is, in fact, the condition of  a theoretical interpretation 
of  Reason’s structure.12
How the thought-act-attitudes relate to each other and to the theological 
framework, however, remains unexplained. This criticism can be so 
sharply stated because Dooyeweerd has shown that in theoretical thought 
we need a supratheoretical and supramodal standpoint for our theoretical 
synthesis. This need is nonexistent in our naive attitude of  thinking, since 
the modal diversity is not abstracted from its coherence. As Canale makes 
clear in his work, the understanding of  “abstraction” that is grounded in 
temporal Being is distinctively different from the classical understanding of  
abstraction. Consequently, the meaning of  the theoretical synthesis will also 
find a reinterpretation. The need for a supratemporal point of  synthesis will 
be rejected. The point from which a synthesis is made possible will not be 
disconnected from the temporal flux. A synthesis, however, whether grounded 
in timeless or temporal Being is needed in the sense of  giving the Gegenstand 
of  thought its proper place within the totality of  reality. Although having a 
critical stance toward Dooyeweerd’s description of  the Gegenstand-relation, he 
has, however, pointed at something inherent to scientific thinking, namely, the 
act of  bringing something into focus by abstracting it into a level that allows 
for closer insight (a microcosmic look) by losing the macrocosmic totality 
from which it was abstracted.13 Because Canale does not develop the structural 
difference between naive and theoretical thinking, he cannot see the crucial 
impact that a high level of  abstraction can have on science and philosophy. 
The subject’s theoretical image is different from the subject’s naive image of  
an object. This difference cannot be explained in Canale’s terms of  “making 
explicit” or “making implicit” as if  it would relate to different levels of  
consciousness. Theoretical thinking, in contrast to naive thinking, is in crucial 
need of  a transcendental idea of  origin in order to allow for a theoretical 
synthesis. A further development of  a clear distinction between naive and 
theoretical reasoning would have helped Canale to see the important function 
of  the universal structural datum as something that needs to be accounted for 
by any thinker in the process of  theoretical conceptualizing.
12Ibid., 134.
13Although Dooyeweerd’s description of  theoretical thought as Gegenstand-
relations received a lot of  critique, especially by thinkers within the Reformed 
tradition, the basic difference between naïve and scientific/theoretical thinking was 
acknowledged. This distinction, however, was worked out differently. See René van 
Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” in Kennis en Werkelijkheid, ed. René van 
Woudenberg (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperhijn, 1996), 43-47.
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4.1.2.2 Critiquing the Interpretation of  the Phenomenological Structure
4.1.2.2.1 Subject, Object, and Normativity
In Canale’s description of  how the subject-object relation should be interpreted 
on the basis of  a biblical temporal foundational ontology, the question arises 
as to how he can defend himself  against subjectivism when accepting Being 
as the temporal flux, i.e., temporality. Is there anything in this temporal flux 
that guarantees unchangeable norms? 
Before describing the problematic in more detail, two things need to 
be underscored: First, the formal structure of  Reason allows for neither 
subjectivism nor objectivism, since both subject and object are needed for 
the generation of  Knowledge. The normativity of  thinking is derived from 
the contents and categories that the ontological interpretation receives.
In Canale’s biblical interpretation of  the structure of  Reason, he 
recognizes a divine normativity in the ontic existence of  God’s creation. This 
ontic normativity as expressed in ontology sets the parameters of  humanity’s 
cognitive capacities, i.e., the brain, with its neurophysical characteristics. But 
the cognitive capacities do not yet determine in a full sense the outcome of  
rational thinking. A variety of  rational articulation is still possible because 
within a biblical understanding of  Reason God did not place human 
knowledge under the administration of  all-encompassing normativity. What 
is meant hereby is that God did not determine humanity in such a way that 
all human beings will think in the same way or they will not be rational. 
This understanding is due to the biblical concept of  individual freedom and 
responsibility. Normativity comes from the outside of  the cognitive sphere of  
the subject, i.e., from the ontic, and not from inside reason or the self.
Although the structure of  Reason as subject-object relation allows 
for neither subjectivism nor objectivism, and although Canale’s biblical 
interpretation of  this subject-object relation knows of  normativity, there 
is a need for more clarity and explanation if  subjectivism really is to be 
overcome. In his conception of  the object’s temporal lines of  intelligibility, 
gathered in cognitive tension, seems to lie the answer that helps to prevent 
subjectivism. But as there is no clear explanation of  what these temporal lines 
of  intelligibility represent and what it is that makes these lines intelligible, the 
problematic of  how a subject-object relation is possible remains. Although the 
structure of  Reason does not allow for either subjectivism or objectivism, and 
although the grounding of  this structural subject-object relation in biblical 
temporal Being promises to overcome the “thing in itself,” i.e., the “thing as it 
appears” dualism, that which establishes the structural subject-object relation 
is not explicated with clarity. Although the problems seem to be removed, the 
solution is still awaited, unless the ontological and epistemological framework 
is developed in more detail. Until then, the question still remains as to which 
normative element is able to establish a temporal subject-object relation.
In Canale’s interpretation of  the structure of  Reason, the subject needs 
to account for the object’s lines of  intelligibility and its own interpretation of  
the structure of  Reason. However, if  the interpretation of  the structure of  
Reason is generated by the spontaneity of  the subject, and if  the naive state 
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of  the subject in which an implicit interpretation of  the structure of  Reason 
is at work is structurally not different from theoretical thinking, the possibility 
of  a subject-subject relation in which the second subject has interpreted its 
own Reason differently is nearly impossible. A subject-subject relationship 
is possible only when both subjects have a common ground for which to 
provide answers. This common ground cannot be Reason, since Reason can be 
interpreted in different ways. A common ground in which both subjects share 
interpretational frameworks is needed if  communication is to be possible. 
It is conceivably possible that naive communication between two different 
people, belonging to two different or even opposing thought traditions, can 
be mutually comprehensible. An evolutionist can talk to a Christian about 
family problems, the weather, and how to cook rice without experiencing 
communication problems. A person can make himself  understood even 
when he explains the arguments for his own worldview to someone who 
does not share his or her worldview. From a biblical perspective, this fact 
can be explained by God’s creational law to which all creation is subject. It 
is surprising that Canale does not include this biblical idea of  normativity 
in his sketch of  a possible temporal interpretation of  the ontological and 
epistemological frameworks, as normativity clearly belongs to the biblical 
conception of  reality.14
Because of  this lack, Canale cannot show as clearly as Dooyeweerd does 
that, although logical concepts are partly constructions of  the human mind, 
they are still bound to normativity. The biblically interpreted structure of  
Reason shows that Reason is not fully “empty” before its ground of  Being and 
frameworks are interpreted, but has intrinsic normativity. Any interpretation 
of  the structure of  Reason will be subject to a multiplicity of  modal laws 
(e.g., logical laws of  distinction), without which an interpretation of  Reason 
would not even be possible. The fact remains that although there are many 
possible interpretations of  Reason, all can be judged on their inner coherence 
or consistency of  logical arguments, thereby pointing to a normativity that 
undergirds all interpretations.
The lack of  specific normativity does not mean that Canale’s interpretational 
conception of  the subject-object relation is necessarily problematic, but that 
he needs to explain, from a biblical perspective, what it is that establishes both 
an ontic and epistemic relationship between subjects and between subjects 
and objects. This implies that both the lines of  intelligibility and the idea of  
dynamic being-appearance need to receive clearer conceptualization.
4.1.2.2.2 Appearance and the Thing in Itself
The need for a clearer understanding of  the subject-subject and subject-object 
relations hints at a further problem. Within a temporal dimensionality of  
Reason, Canale makes being-appearance co-appear with Being. Consequently, 
in a temporal framework the gap between being and appearance no longer 
14Albert M. Wolters, Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview, 2d 
ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 12-18.
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exists: appearance is being as thing in itself.15 However, experience (the 
structural datum) shows that objects and subjects do not fully appear with all 
their attributes to the subject with which they have a structural relationship. 
This is not just due to time in the sense that, at a particular point in time, not 
enough lines of  intelligibility have been gathered. The incomplete appearance 
of  the structural datum is inherent to the subject’s perceptive limitations. 
Many examples could be given. For example, humans do not perceive infrared 
light, but a deer does. We, therefore, need to conclude that being-appearance 
does not mean that all characteristics of  a certain object are perceived by 
the subject. Thus, the temporal “thing in itself ” should not be considered 
identical to its appearance. 
My critique here concerns the question of  how appearance, as limited 
being-appearance, can be understood without falling back into the distinction 
between being and appearance.
4.1.2.2.3 Abstract and Pretheoretical
Canale’s redefinition of  “abstract” within the temporal framework triggers 
questions. On one hand, he reformulates the abstract as having a “promise 
character” that is neither right nor wrong since the temporal extension of  
Being into the future has not yet taken place.16 On the other hand, the lines of  
intelligibility, as far as they are understood, are themselves of  abstract character, 
since they reveal themselves through time as characteristics of  a certain being. By 
means of  the cognitive gathering act, these lines are abstracted from the diversity 
of  being in extended time.17 I think that a reformulation of  the abstract as being 
of  a promise character alone is, however, problematic if  an idea of  the abstract 
is to find some usability in the world of  nontheological, scientific disciplines. 
Canale should have integrated his ideas about the lines of  intelligibility in his 
redefinition of  the abstract. In fact, I think that an interconnection between 
the lines of  intelligibility and the promise character is possible, as even the 
lines of  intelligibility are of  relative character and need to be proven true while 
extending into the future. They are, therefore, of  promise character as well. 
In this context, Canale could have elaborated his indication of  “determinable 
indeterminancy”18 as an understanding of  temporal-grounded abstraction (see. 
2.6). By this term, Canale refers to the expression of  patterns the object reveals 
in its temporal extension (as the determinable part), which requires the temporal 
openness of  the object as it extends further into the future, expressing and 
refining its lines of  intelligibility. Both the promise character and the abstraction 
process as cognitive gathering act should have been integrated.
Associated with these critical remarks is Canale’s unelaborated distinction 





19Ibid., 27, n. 4; 374-375.
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intelligibility are included in the definition of  the abstract, a theoretical tension-
gathering process could be distinguished from a nontheoretical tension-
gathering process. The absence of  this differentiation hinders Canale’s ability 
to easily uncover the different absolutizations within contemporary scientific 
disciplines. It is helpful to speak of  high and low levels of  abstraction. The 
abstraction process, including the promise character and gathering process 
of  the lines of  intelligibility, is not only characteristic of  theoretical thought, 
but pertains to all human ways of  understanding. However, this abstraction 
process can be differently performed in different thought-act-attitudes: naive 
(low level of  abstraction) and theoretical (high level of  abstraction).
4.1.3 Critique on Dooyeweerd
Dooyeweerd’s thinking is much more detailed and developed than Canale’s. 
His thinking also has had a much greater impact than Canale’s. His influence 
has been tremendous, especially within the Reformed Christian tradition of  
philosophy.20 Because of  this popularity, he has been discussed and critiqued 
in various ways by many people both from within and without his own 
thought tradition.21
A brief  look at the critique on Dooyeweerd shows that it mostly targets 
his transcendental critique of  theoretical thought. I will, therefore, try to 
include in my critique some of  the critical remarks that have been expressed 
against the transcendental critique and that are of  interest for the encounter 
with Canale’s work.
4.1.3.1 Phenomenology and Interpretation
A critique on Dooyeweerd considered from the perspective of  Canale’s 
structure of  Reason requires the understanding that Canale’s object of  
analysis, Reason, is not identical with Dooyeweerd’s object of  analysis, 
theoretical thought. In Canale’s work, theoretical thinking is a part of  Reason 
as a whole, while in Dooyeweerd’s work theoretical thinking is just one of  the 
many ways of  knowing.
It is clear that both a dimensionality and an ontological framework 
are already involved and active in Dooyeweerd’s “structural analysis”: his 
understanding of  theoretical thought is dependent on his modal theory and 
20Alvin Plantinga, “Christian Philosophy at the End of  the 20th Century,” in 
Christian Philosophy at the Close of  the Twentieth Century: Assessment and Perspective, ed. S. 
Griffioen, B. M. Balk, and Association for Calvinist Philosophy (Kampen: Uitgeverij 
Kampen, 1995), 30; René van Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken: Inleiding tot een Christelijke 
Filosofie, Verantwoording (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, Kok, 2004), 23.
21Yong Joon Choi, Dialogue and Antithesis: A Philosophical Study on the Significance 
of  Herman Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique, Hermit Kingdom Studies in History 
and Religion (Cheltenham, PA: Hermit Kingdom, 2006), 35-39, 47-52, 59-65; 
Henk Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique: Transforming It 
Hermeneutically,” in Contemporary Reflections on the Philosophy of  Herman Dooyeweerd, ed. 
D. F. M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (Lewisten: Edwin Mellen, 2000), 84.
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view of  cosmic time. It is his modal theory as ontology that makes his specific 
arguments within the first and second ways of  his transcendental critique 
possible. My critique is that Dooyeweerd’s analysis did not lay bare the 
systematization of  Reason, but rather the biblical interpretation of  a part of  
it as system. Dooyeweerd’s analysis of  the structure of  thought is, therefore, a 
laying-bare of  a structure that can only be expressed on the basis of  a distinct 
interpretation of  Reason’s structure. 
However, the general phenomenological structure of  Reason does not 
exclude the possibility of  more specific phenomenological structures within 
the basic structure of  Reason that are not yet dependent on any interpretation. 
The description of  naive and theoretical thinking that both have a clear 
analytic character could be a part of  a regional formal structure of  Reason 
that needs to receive an interpretation.
 
4.1.3.2 Analogy and Ontology
As discussed in my earlier article,22 Dooyeweerd’s basic critique of  Thomistic 
philosophy and other non-Christian philosophy is that cosmic time is wrongly 
interpreted and that the heart is not accepted or seen as the religious root-
unity of  humanity. It is the understanding of  the supratemporal heart as the 
religious root-unity of  humanity that enables the correct interpretation of  
cosmic time. Dooyeweerd’s reinterpretation of  cosmic time automatically led 
to a new understanding of  analogy.23 However, his proposal that it is through 
the supratemporal unity that cosmic time breaks into the irreducible diversity 
of  modalities demonstrates the timeless dimensionality of  his concept of  
Reason.24
From the perspective of  the structure of  Reason, we then need to say that 
Dooyeweerd’s critique does not go far enough. He also should have critically 
inquired into the ground of  Being on which the Thomistic interpretation of  
the basic relational framework between Creator and creation rests. Just as 
with Thomistic philosophy, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is grounded in timeless 
Being, even though there are differences between the Dooyeweerdian and the 
Thomistic-Aristotelian understandings of  timelessness.25 The consequences 
of  this understanding of  Being is that the borderline between God and 
the created world is not between God and the created world as such, but 
between temporal creation and a timeless God, and it is this understanding 
that helps to technically delineate the relation between unity and diversity in 
Dooyeweerd’s argument.
22Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological 
Methodology, Part III.”
23Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological 
Methodologicy, Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 15-18.
24It has been suggested by other Christian thinkers that the modal diversity can 
also be explained on the basis of  the architecture of  God’s law. See Choi, 53.
25Cf. Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological 
Methodology, Part I,” 22., n. 58. 
268 Seminary StudieS 48 (autumn 2010)
The question we, therefore, need to consider is how Dooyeweerd’s view 
of  the relation between creation and Creator (continuity and discontinuity) is 
to be evaluated if  it is grounded in an understanding of  Being that is foreign 
to the biblical message itself.26
4.1.3.3 Time and Timelessness
Although Dooyeweerd does elaborately criticize the different interpretations 
given to the time-timeless frameworks, he does not criticize timeless Being 
as such.
Dooyeweerd’s choice for a timeless dimensionality of  Reason can be 
traced back to the traditional Reformed Christian idea that time was created 
at the moment of  creation. There was thus no time before creation. This 
conclusion does not find any textual biblical support and seems to be much 
more rooted in the philosophy of  Parmenides, which became mixed with 
the Christian understanding that God, as Creator, exists independently from 
his creation.27 Because time was considered an essential part of  creation in 
classical philosophy, the independence of  God from his creation had to 
demand timelessness. By identifying God as Creator with timelessness, the 
understanding of  his sovereignty and absolute independence from his creation 
found a philosophically valid yet unbiblical explanatory possibility. 
A complete rejection of  Dooyeweerd’s philosophy on the basis of  his 
dimensionality of  Reason would, however, result in the failure to uncover 
his original attempt to find a solution to the subject-object relation.28 Such 
a rejection would only demonstrate that the distinct influence of  the theos-
framework of  Reason, understood independently of  the foundational 
ontology, is not understood properly. It is true that foundational ontology 
sets the basic structure of  all of  Reason’s frameworks, but the interpretation 
of  foundational ontology does not set the direction of  the interpretation of  
ontos or logos. As the history of  philosophy has shown, the basis of  a single 
interpretation of  foundational ontology allows for different interpretations of  
the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The cause for these different 
interpretations can, therefore, not be found in foundational ontology since a 
26H. G. Geertsema, “Transcendentale Openheid: Over het Zinkarakter van de 
Werkelijkheid in de Wijsbegeerte van H. Dooyeweerd,” Philosophia Reformata: Orgaan 
van de Vereiniging voor Calvinisticsche Wijsbegeerte, 35 (1970): 54.
27On this issue, see, e.g., Thorleif  Boman, Das Hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit 
dem Griechischen, 5, neubearb. und erw. Aufl. ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1977), 31-39; Fernando Luis Canale, “Basic Elements of  Christian Theology,” §33-
§40; Oscar Cullmann, “Immortality of  the Soul or Resurrection of  the Dead?” in 
Immorality, ed. Terence Penelhum (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973), 53-85; James 
Muilenberg, “The Biblical View of  Time,” Harvard Theological Review 54 (1961): 225-
252.
28L. Zuidervaart, “The Great Turning Point: Religion and Rationality in 
Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of  the Society of  
Christian Philosophers 21 (2004): 76.
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large extent of  the pluralism of  ontologies and epistemologies is grounded 
on the same foundational ontology. The source of  this pluralism is thus not 
foundational ontology, but the interpretation of  the theological framework.
One could question whether Dooyeweerd’s dimensionality is Aristotelian, 
which would be of  a great importance, if  the object of  study is biblical 
philosophy.29 A hasty rejection, however, would prevent one from seeing 
how Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, even though grounded in timeless Being, 
attempted to fundamentally break with classical and Aristotelian conceptions 
of  ontology and epistemology by choosing a different interpretation of  the 
theological framework.30 By means of  his modal theory, Dooyeweerd basically 
breaks with the classical hierarchical ontology, and by using his understanding 
of  the subject-object relation he creatively tries to overcome the gap between 
subject and object. The whole idea of  substance and essence (e.g., form-
matter, nature-grace, and nature-freedom) is also claimed to be overcome by 
the modal theory. Dooyeweerd’s attempt to overcome subject-object dualism 
takes place in Reason’s timeless dimensionality. The explanation of  diversity is 
found within the time-supratemporal-[non-Greek]-timelessness tension. 
From a Canalian perspective, it is doubtful whether Dooyeweerd is 
really able to overcome the form-matter problem since Canale locates the 
origin of  the problem in timeless foundational ontology. There is reason 
to question whether a dualism remains between the supratemporal “heart” 
and the temporal “body,” although Dooyeweerd rejects such a possibility.31 
Additionally, one might wonder if  the specific understanding of  the Gegenstand-
relation with its intentional abstraction from temporal coherence is not a 
relict of  classical-dualistic thinking. It is certain that, by his dimensionality 
of  Reason, Dooyeweerd maintains a dualism between creation and Creator, 
which leads to a certain mysticism necessary for achieving knowledge of  
God.32 As far as I can see, this must be the reason why Dooyeweerd did not 
spend much effort explaining in detail how the supratemporal heart receives 
its ideas of  origin, unity, and coherence. It remains a mystery how it is possible 
29Although Dooyeweerd takes distance from a Greek-Aristotelian understanding 
of  timelessness, one should wonder whether the explanantion suffices to say that 
Dooyeweerd does not at all have a non-Greek notion of  timelessness. What his 
explanation does is to avoid a reductionistic version of  timelessness (cf. Glanz, “Time, 
Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, Critical Assessment, and Further 
Development of  Herman Dooyeweerd’s Structural Analysis of  Theoretical Thought 
and Fernando Canale’s Phenomenological Analysis of  the Structure of  Reason and 
Its Biblical Interpretaion”), it does not argue for an eternal temporality of  God, even 
though it seems that Dooyeweerd understands that the timelessness of  God does not 
hinder God from acting temporally.
30Zuidervaart, 76.
31Gerrit Glas, “Filosofische Antropologie,” in Kennis en Werkelijkheid: Tweede Inleiding 
tot een Christelijke Filosofie, ed. René van Woudenberg, Verantwoording (Amsterdam: 
Buijten & Schipperheijn, Kok, 1996), 114-121.
32Cf. Glanz, “Part III: Application and Comparison,” §3.3.3.
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that through revelation we receive these transcendental ideas.33 In biblical 
thinking, the divine act of  revelation is not of  a timeless or supratemporal 
nature, but is rather placed within the temporality that characterizes created 
reality and is, therefore, detached from mystic paths to divine knowledge. 
Therefore, the process of  revelation is not understood as a problem for man’s 
onticity.34 Knowledge of  God does not need to be achieved through methods 
of  ecstasy, asceticism, rational abstraction, or spiritual mysticism.35
It is, however, crucial to observe that Dooyeweerd’s modal theory does 
not necessarily need to derive its ideological legitimation from a timeless 
foundational ontology. The necessary ingredient of  the modal theory is merely 
the ontological conception of  creation’s dependence on an independent 
Creator. To interpret this dependence-independence relation as cosmic time-
timeless relation is just one possibility. The crux of  the modal theory as a tool 
to criticize theoretical thought is its explication of  the need for an Archimedean 
standpoint through which unity and coherence can be explained. The theory 
shows that many modalities could theoretically offer this Archimedean 
standpoint through the theoretical Gegenstand-relation in combination with the 
dogma of  the autonomy of  rational thought. It thus seems that Dooyeweerd 
targets, in the first place, something supramodal rather than supratemporal 
to overcome the danger of  reductionism. The modal theory can thus also be 
applied within a temporal dimensionality of  Reason. The need for identifying 
the true Archimedean standpoint with supratemporality is only because the 
modal diversity is understood to be different expressions of  time necessarily 
referring to a basic supratemporal unity.
To conclude my critical remarks on Dooyeweerd’s understanding of  
time, I want to stress that his critique especially targets the absolutization 
of  any Gegenstand-relation on the basis of  the dogma of  the autonomy of  
theoretical thought as it can be found within the history of  philosophy and 
the modern humanistic thought tradition. He strongly inquired into and 
criticized this absolutization. H. G. Geertsema similarly states: “Het theo-
ontologisch kader als zodanig, waarin het theoretisch denken zich sterk 
gemaakt heeft, had minder zijn kritische belangstelling.”36 He seems to point 
out an undiscovered dimensionality in Dooyeweerd’s thought that had not 
received a critical inquiry. That a classical timeless understanding of  Being 
seems to be still at work can be seen in the fact that (a) the heart and (b) the 
transcendental ideas are interpreted as supratemporal, making it difficult to 
33Van Woudenberg, 55.
34See Fernando Luis Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive 
Foundation of  Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Landham, MD: University Press of  
America, 2001), 132-137; Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets, 2 volumes (Peabody: 
Prince, 2001), 1:104-146.
35Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 133.
36Eng.: “The theo-ontological framework as such, in which theoretical thought 
grew strong, was of  less interest to him” (Geertsema, “Transcendentale Openheid: Over 
het Zinkarakter van de Werkelijkheid in de Wijsbegeerte van H. Dooyeweerd,” 54).
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understand divine revelation and inspiration.37 A further trace of  timeless 
Being can be seen when (c) theoretical thought is characterized as abstracting 
from the temporal coherence of  reality and the unclear description of  how 
the transcendental ideas are received. The latter especially allows for critically 
questioning whether the problematic dualism between Creator and created 
humanity was really overcome by Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. 
Contrary to Dooyeweerd’s critique on absolutization, Canale’s critique 
would go further and challenge the very foundation on which such an 
absolutization is placed.
4.1.3.4 General Logical Slip in the Argument
The critique in this section targets the logical consistency of  Dooyeweerd’s 
argumentation. This more analytic critique will help to discover what value 
Canale’s analysis may have for a further development of  Dooyeweerd’s 
transcendental critique.
Along with others, Lambert Zuidervaart, as a Reformed philosopher, 
finds a central contradition in Dooyeweerd’s line of  argument.38 In his 
transcendental critique, Dooyeweerd performs precisely that which he claims 
to be impossible, i.e., to give a theoretical explanation of  that which surpasses 
the limits of  theoretical thought. In doing so, his argument for the universally 
valid conditions of  theoretical thought is disqualified, thereby revealing a 
logical slip in Dooyeweerd’s argument for the nonneutrality of  theoretical 
thought. Zuidervaart summarizes the flow of  the argumentation in eight 
steps:39 
No one could engage in theoretical thought were it not for universally 1. 
valid conditions that make such thought possible.
Any philosophy can identify these conditions by analyzing the 2. 
structure of  theoretical thought itself.
Such an analysis shows three universally valid conditions that make 3. 
theoretical thought possible:
the a. Gegenstand-relation between the logical and nonlogical 
aspects,
the supratheoretical unity of  aspects found in the theorizing b. 
agent,
the agent’s radical dependence on something other than itself. c. 
The agent can either be dependent on the absolute origin of  4. 
everything or on some substitute that is itself  dependent on the 
absolute origin.
37This difficulty can be clearly seen where Dooyeweerd argues for the religious 
ground-motive as having supreatemporal character, although they seem to have a clear 
historical characteristic (cf. Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief,” §5.2.5).
38Van Woudenberg, 54-55.
39Zuidervaart, 77-78.
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No system of  theoretical thought can avoid employing ideas about 5. 
the ontological status of  the conditions that make theoretical thought 
possible. These ideas concern coherence, unity, and origin.
The sources of  these ideas are found in the supratheoretical religious 6. 
ground-motive.
The biblical ground-motive is the crucial and unavoidable source of  7. 
the true transcendental ideas.
In detail, the transcendental ideas concern:8. 
the temporal and intermodal coherence of  meaning,a. 
the deeper common identity (unity) of  the modal aspects of  b. 
meaning,
the divine origin of  meaning in its coherence and unity.c. 
Dooyeweerd’s Gegenstand-relation is impossible to conceptualize without 
assuming diversity within reality. This assumption should not be considered 
a problem of  argument, because agreement can be found among different 
philosophers on the existence of  reality as diversity. However, the specific 
understanding of  the Gegenstand-relation presupposes an understanding 
of  theoretical thought that is abstracted from the coherence of  a specific 
diversity of  meaning-being. Such an understanding is only possible on the 
basis of  the modal theory as a theory on time in which an abstraction from 
temporal coherence is possible.40 Thus steps 5-8 in Dooyeweerd’s argument 
are presupposed in premises 1-4. With the help of  Canale’s analysis, I agree 
with Zuidervaart that Dooyeweerd’s “formal” results of  analysis are quite 
dependent on his presupposed “content.”41
4.2 Transforming the Analysis
After having refined the phenomenological analysis of  the structure of  
Reason, it can be fruitfully used for a systematic development of  biblical 
philosophy in general and exegetical methodology in specific. In the process 
of  such development, one will need to recognize the depths and insights 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy testifies to by its different biblically inspired motives 
(e.g., creation-fall-redemption, the heart, human responsibility, meaning-being). 
On the basis of  a temporal dimensionality of  Reason, the development of  an 
interpretation of  Reason’s frameworks can be accompanied by the integration 
of  important aspects of  Dooyeweerdian thought. Yet such integration will 
need to entail the transformation of  these aspects from timelessness in 
temporal grounding. 
Within this final section, I will show in what way it would be possible to 
integrate insights and aspects of  Dooyeweerd’s philosophy into a temporally 
grounded interpretation of  Reason’s formal structure. Although I will not claim 
40Choi, 67.
41Zuidervaart, 79. For a more detailed description, see Glanz, “Time, Reason and 
Religious Belief,” 127-130.
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to develop a suggestion of  a truly biblical interpretation of  Reason’s formal 
structure, I do think that my suggestion is inspired by biblical insights both 
on the level of  Being and on the level of  the ontological and epistemological 
frameworks. The integration of, especially, Dooyeweerd’s modal theory and 
the conception of  the subject as imago Dei will allow for an interpretation of  
the ontological framework, which, in turn, will function as the background 
of  the development of  the epistemological framework. By this, a distinction 
between naive and theoretical thinking can be worked out, which will allow 
for a much better understanding of  scientific disciplines and the limits of  
theoretical thinking.
In such a project of  refinement, one needs to be constantly aware of  
the critique on and fruits of  the work of  both Canale and Dooyeweerd. 
Such a project represents a very complex task that cannot be accomplished 
within the scope of  an article series, here I can try only to selectively outline 
the contours of  the refinement of  Canale’s formal structure of  Reason 
and the development of  a biblical interpretation of  Reason’s frameworks 
by an integration of  Dooyeweerdian elements. A broader outline of  my 
transformational suggestions can be found in my Masters’ thesis.
4.2.1 Meaning and Phenomenological Analysis
To make the phenomenological analysis of  Reason more transparent, it is 
necessary to explicate its ontological assumptions. Such an explication must 
clarify the term “Reason” as phenomenon and the term “logical” as principle 
of  the analytic-phenomenological method (cf. 4.1.2.1.1).
The explanation of  the term “Reason” as the realm of  Logos should 
be distinguished from the realm of  Meaning. The existence of  Meaning is a 
necessary presupposition of  Reason’s functioning. Meaning is not constituted 
by Reason, but rather is experienced through Reason when Reason is taken 
as the subject-object relation from which knowledge and meaning flow. 
Meaning is only constituted by theos/the One, through which it receives its 
radical relational dependence character. The realm of  Reason as the realm of  
Logos should be explained as the realm of  subjectively expressed Meaning. 
Knowledge then always concerns the subject’s understanding (in its broadest 
sense) of  Meaning. Hence the phenomenological analysis of  Reason focuses 
on the formal structure that allows for a subject’s generation of  meaningful 
knowledge.42 
The term “Reason” must be explained as universalized Reason. 
Universalized Reason should be made plausible on the basis of  the existence 
of  Meaning as a presupposition of  Reason’s functioning. Meaning cannot, 
therefore, be a product of  Reason’s functioning. Further, the diversity of  
Meaning is not experienced as a reality that allows for a complete Knowledge 
determination. Additionally, it should be stressed that universalized Reason 
42From a biblical perspective, Meaning is not constructed, but already present. 
Existence is intrinsically meaningful. Meaning is not created by humanity’s rational 
thinking (even taken in its broad sense), but conceptualized through humanity’s 
rational involvement.
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includes the existence of  a subject and an object that interrelate. The 
possibility of  the relation between subject and object is accounted for by 
their complementarity that finds its source in a theos and his coappearing 
Being. Since the object in its relation with a subject also belongs to Reason, 
universalized Reason consequently cannot be limited to the analytic thinking 
of  a subject, but must include ontology.
The “logical” principle by which the phenomenological analysis of  
Reason is made possible should be explained as a formal analytic manner of  
distinction and a formal analytic manner of  synthesis. The formal analytic 
manner of  distinction will give access to the different parts of  the whole of  
Reason, while the formal analytic manner of  synthesis will allow for making 
explicit the existing structural interrelations between the different parts of  
Reason as a whole. The need for explaining the possibility of  formal analytic 
distinction and synthesis in opposition to the material analytic distinction 
and synthesis is important if  one wants to prevent a vicious circle in regard 
to the discovery that any logic needs to be grounded in a specific Logos. 
Regardless of  whether logic is grounded in temporal or timeless Logos, the 
phenomenological analysis should arrive at the same formal description 
when it restricts itself  to the formal function of  logic. If  this is not possible, 
consequently suspicion will rise, if  the result of  the phenomenological analysis 
is not religiously influenced and determined by a specific interpretation of  
Being. While one may try to develop an interpretation that suggests that 
only “material” logic (necessarily involved in the interpretation of  Reason’s 
structure) is grounded in a Logos, nevertheless a “formal” logic has universal 
“trans-Logos” character.43 Hereby explicit distance can be taken from the 
possible misunderstanding that the phenomenological analysis already 
constitutes an interpretation of  the phenomenon.
4.2.2 The Place of  the Transcendental Idea of  
Origin and Coherencein the Phenomenological 
Structure of  Reason
The idea of  origin is linked with the theological framework of  Reason. Without 
theos, there is no theological framework; nor is there any other framework 
of  Reason. The structural independence status of  the theos guarantees the 
existence of  ontic and epistemic coherence.44 It, therefore, plays a major 
role in the development of  the ontological and epistemological frameworks. 
The formal function of  the theological framework is its independent status 
in contrast to being as dependent being that finds its interpretation in the 
ontological framework. The formal ontic dependence on the idea of  origin 
demonstrates, in the relation of  the ontological framework to the theological 
framework, that ontic dependence is accompanied by a formal epistemic 
dependence on the idea of  origin. Without a primary belief, synthetical 
43“Material” logic would work as “formal” logic, which is grounded in a specific 
Being-interpretation.
44See Clouser, 9-58.
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conclusions and concepts are impossible.45 Thus the formal structural 
relation between the theological and ontological/epistemological frameworks 
is of  an independence-dependence character.46 In the construction of  any 
philosophical or scientific concept, this structural relation must necessarily 
be interpreted, as is recognized throughout the history of  philosophy. This 
is Dooyeweerd’s great insight that remains of  much value, as this structural 
understanding is not dependent on the specific argument he developed on 
the basis of  his modal theory and within his dimensionality of  Reason.47 
Henceforth, I will refer to the necessary choice for a theos or “the One”48 as 
the necessary choice for Reason’s direction while it functions in its coappearing 
of  Being as the ultimate horizon for any understanding.49
As the formal structure of  Reason and the comparison between 
Dooyeweerd and Canale show, the interpretation of  the independence status 
does not fully determine all the other frameworks since the independence-
dependence relation is structurally attributed by foundational ontology. This 
implies that Dooyeweerd’s cosmic time-timelessness dichotomy should be 
understood not merely as a problematic interpretation, but also as a hint of  
an underlying formal structure. On one hand, Dooyeweerd’s cosmic time-
timelessness framework points to the structurally necessary dependence-
independence relation. On the other, it points to the structurally necessary 
concept of  Being as nonbeing50 and the source of  coherence in which the 
structurally necessary dependence-independence framework can be placed. 
In Dooyeweerd’s case, this structurally necessary concept is interpreted as 
timeless Being. This interpretation helped him to understand that creational 
45As far as I can see, the theos functions on a formal level as the independent 
origin of  the dependent ontic reality, as well as the origin of  the epistemic ideas of  
coherence and unity. This is also true for pantheistic thought, as Clouser has shown 
(see ibid., 48-50). Consequently, the relation between independence status of  the theos 
versus the ontic and epistemic dependence status of  creation has a universal formal 
character and needs to be interpreted. Contrary to Canale, who sees the theos formally 
only functioning as the source for articulating coherence and unity, I would, therefore, 
suggest that indpendence appears and can be argued for not only at the level of  the 
interpretation of  the formal components of  Reason, but on the very level of  the 
formal structure of  Reason.
46Compared to Clouser, the theos on which the ontic and epistemic are dependent 
functions as noetic and ontic primary belief.
47Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique: Transforming It 
Hermeneutically,” 85.
48Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 63, n. 1.
49The term “Reason’s direction” is chosen, as it refers to the direction given to 
Reason by Reason’s origin (the subject, object, and possibility for their relationship). 
The “backward direction” to the self ’s origin determines the understanding of  
Reason, and the “forward direction” as Reason allows for further rational expression 
of  Meaning.
50Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.2.3.
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aspects were considered autonomous because they were identified with 
timelessness.
Formally seen, autonomy is not necessarily connected with timelessness, 
and the answer to the question of  Being allows for multiple independence 
status. A refinement of  the phenomenological structure of  Reason will need 
to emphasize this. Any concept of  the independence-dependence structure 
can be attributed by different interpretations of  foundational ontology. 
The interpretation of  foundational ontology is thus structurally not derived 
from the interpretation of  the independence-dependence relation, but is the 
background in which the interpretation of  the independence-dependence 
relation takes place. Being’s characteristic of  coherence as nonbeing can 
only be guessed at or derived from a self-revelatory theos and points out the 
possibility for hypothesis of  Reason. From a Christian perspective, Reason’s 
ability to be hypothesized is interpreted as the necessity of  faith. 
A Christian who believes in the words of  the prophets preserved within 
Scripture will ask whether the independent Creator of  all creation does not 
himself  reveal his ground of  Being to humanity. In search of  this answer, 
the Christian thinker will be able to derive his understanding of  foundational 
ontology from the independent biblical God as theos, not because of  God’s 
independent status, but because of  the thinker’s trust in Holy Scripture. The 
ground of  Being can find expression, but is not necessarily determined by 
that which has independent status (e.g., evolutionism can be connected with 
temporal or timeless Being). Only there, where the chosen theos expresses its 
ground of  Being, it must determine the interpretation of  the dimensionality of  
Reason. Consequently, Christian theology should reflect on the implications 
of  the biblical revelation of  God’s Being as coappearing with his being. 
Henceforth, I will refer to the coappearing Being as Reason’s setting.51
Seeing Reason’s direction and setting as primordial presuppositions for 
any interpretation of  Reason, the understanding of  Canale’s dimensionality 
of  Reason would be broadened. Reason’s dimensionality would no longer 
simply refer to the ground of  Being (Reason’s setting), but also to the content 
of  the primary belief  (Reason’s direction). Such a use of  terms could also 
help to overcome the lack of  clarity found in Canale’s writing regarding the 
location of  the source of  coherence.
The content of  Reason’s setting and its direction as its dimensionality 
cannot be found or generated from the formal structure of  Reason itself. 
The content of  the dimensionality of  Reason cannot be autonomously 
deduced by humans, but only guessed at or accepted through revelation. The 
biblical interpretation of  the dimensionality of  Reason is not guessed at, but 
revealed as God reveals himself  as theos (Reason’s direction), coappearing 
with temporal Being (Reason’s setting).52
Knowing that coherence is established through Being as the Logos of  
logic (Reason’s setting), the specific interpretation of  Being will provide the 
51The term “Reason’s setting” is chosen, as it refers to the setting in which the 
origin is put or reveals itself.
52Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 373.
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basic framework for the development of  a detailed concept of  ontic coherence 
as the interpretation of  the ontological framework. This is especially necessary 
if  the existence of  the subject-object relation is to be theoretically explained. 
Reason’s temporal setting enables the avoidance of  the dualism between the 
various forms of  the “thing in itself ” and “thing as it appears.” The possible 
avoidance of  the theoretical subject-object problem is, however, not the 
same as the establishment of  a theoretical explanation of  the subject-object 
relation. I find Dooyeweerd’s explanation of  the inner modal coherence by 
means of  analogical moments particularly persuasive. If  Dooyeweerd’s idea 
of  coherence is transformed in such a way that it is disconnected from the 
idea of  supratemporal unity, an incorporation of  the modal theory into the 
biblical interpretation of  the ontological framework should be possible and 
fruitful. The specific idea of  coherence received from the theos and developed 
in the ontological framework is secondary to the general coherence that is 
provided by Being. A biblical development of  specific coherence will need to 
be placed into temporal Being. 
Inspired by the biblical idea of  the God-given laws and norms to which 
all of  creation is subject, a modal theory can be developed. The modal theory 
with its multiple laws in specific law-spheres related through multimodal 
analogical moments enables a developed idea of  temporal coherence. This 
detailed idea of  coherence must, however, be grounded in temporal Being in 
order to be biblical. This implies that no law or norm is to be understood as 
timeless, but as temporal and given by a truly autonomous God.
So far I have tried to argue that the idea of  origin is formally connected 
to theos. The identification of  the theos, i.e., the interpretation of  origin, is 
a matter of  the subjective choice. Further, the idea of  coherence is formally 
connected to foundational ontology as coappearing with theos, but formally 
being undetermined by theos. It is only in the case of  a self-revelatory theos, 
such as the biblical God, that humanity can know the ground of  Being 
through the theos, which allows for the complementarity (coherence) of  all 
of  Reason’s frameworks.
4.2.3 The Self, Its Unity, and the 
Source of  Self-understanding
Theos as origin and foundational ontology as ground of  coherence lead us to 
the question as to which part of  Reason the idea of  unity is to be connected. As 
far as I can see, this question cannot be answered without further developing 
the formal function of  the self  within the structure of  Reason.
In his phenomenology, Canale describes the structural necessity of  
a subject characterized by its spontaneity that allows for the interpretation 
of  Reason’s structure. A more detailed interpretation of  the self, including a 
further interpretation of  the spontaneity of  the subject as human freedom, 
belongs to the ontological framework. In my critique (cf. 4.1.2.1.3) I have 
pointed out that the phenomenological analysis should be able to give a 
more detailed insight into the nature of  the formal requirement of  the self. 
Such elaborate analysis would show that structurally, the ontic and epistemic 
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realms come together in the subject in a radical dependence on their common 
origin. This structural dependence of  the concept of  the subject on its origin 
emphasizes that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of  the 
self ’s origin (theos), is a basic formal condition of  the structure of  Reason. 
That the ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject implies 
that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of  the self ’s 
origin, directly influences ontological and epistemological conceptions and 
allows for their unity. I think that this insight is still of  descriptive and not 
yet of  interpretative nature. Any further understanding will, however, move 
beyond the scope of  phenomenological description. 
Leaving the formal description of  Reason with the self  as its part, I will now 
look upon the interpretation of  the self  as belonging to the development of  the 
ontological framework. From a Christian perspective, it is crucial to understand 
the heart as the center of  a human’s existence. I think that Dooyeweerd paves the 
way for a biblical interpretation of  the self  by means of  his concept of  the heart 
as the religious root of  human existence.53 However, a biblical interpretation 
of  the self  as heart or soul does not imply the idea of  supratemporality.54 
Dooyeweerd’s supratemporal understanding of  the heart is only demanded 
because of  his timeless ground of  Being. A conceptual understanding of  
the heart that overcomes the danger of  identifying the self  with one of  its 
functions demands the implementation of  the modal theory. Accepting the 
heart as humanity’s religious center and expression of  divine unity allows for 
the understanding of  it as an expression of  the unity of  modal coherence in 
its radical dependence on its true origin. Of  paramount importance for the 
development of  the epistemological framework will be that the heart or self  is 
interpreted as temporal within the development of  the ontological framework. 
This will have influence on the understanding of  theoretical abstraction, and 
the generation of  hermeneutical principles as I have outlined elsewhere.55
A biblical interpretation of  the spontaneity of  the self  as human 
freedom will necessarily receive a spiritual dimension. The necessity of  an 
understanding of  one’s origin as a choice of  faith that interprets Reason’s 
direction in order to allow for the rational expression of  Meaning implies a 
concept of  freedom that describes humanity as not free from but free for 
responsibility—a religious choice. Humanity will need to accept a Creator 
or Arche of  its existence in order to have a lookout tower from where it can 
have an overview of  the diversity around it. This lookout tower will, in fact, 
be “the place where he finds himself.”56 A biblical interpretation of  the self  
is therefore strongly dependent on the biblical conception of  God as it finds 
expression in the theological framework. 
A further implication of  the biblical insight into the radical freedom of  
humanity is that a concept must be formed that accounts for the fact that the 
53Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 93.
54Ibid., 93.
55Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief,” 143-145.
56Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 92.
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I can be simultaneously aware of  its current choice and its ability and freedom 
to choose any time for different interpretations of  Reason’s direction and 
setting. There is thus a structural independence accompanying the self ’s 
choice of  origin.
The implication of  the biblical interpretation of  the self  regarding the 
idea of  unity is that the heart or self  is created with the ability to experience 
and understand the diversity of  creation as a unity as the epistemic and 
ontic unite in the subject. This ontological understanding finds its ontic and 
epistemic origin, however, in the revelation of  God. As the interpretation of  
God belongs to the theological framework, the idea of  unity is to be located 
within the theological framework as it originates there. As Meaning implies the 
unity of  the self  since the diversity of  being is not experienced antithetically 
but coherently, I think that the formal description of  the structure of  
Reason could include the unity of  the subject as a formal structural fact. 
The interpretation of  this unity-subject-fact, however, is received from the 
theological framework.
Herewith I have placed all Dooyeweerd’s transcendental ideas within 
the formal structure of  Reason. Dooyeweerd’s transcendental ideas function 
as hermeneutical formal presupposition within the structure of  Reason. 
Content needs to be given to these ideas if  an expression of  Meaning is to 
be possible.
4.2.4 The Need for Normativity in the Establishment 
of  Subject-Object Relations
As far as I can see, Canale’s interpretation of  the phenomenological structure 
of  Reason does help to overcome the dualism between being and appearance, 
but that which establishes the structural subject-object relation is not explained. 
One can say that the problem of  dualism seems to be removed, but that the 
solution is still to be awaited. The general understanding of  temporal coherence 
is not sufficient for developing a theoretical concept of  that which constitutes 
the subject-object relation. A more detailed understanding of  coherence within 
Reason’s temporal dimensionality (setting and direction) needs to be developed 
as part of  the ontological framework.
In the subject-object relation, the activity of  interpretation always 
belongs to the subject side and stands over against the objective fact. There 
where the interpretation of  the subject-object relation does not involve 
a normative-factual side, the subject-object conception easily falls into the 
danger of  relativism.57 Because the epistemological side always depends 
on the ontological for its contents, the development of  an ontological 
framework that has normative characteristics is crucial to overcome the 
danger of  subjectivism. I think that Canale’s current development of  the 
interpretation of  the structure of  Reason will not lead to relativism if  the 
biblical law-idea is introduced in the further development of  the ontological 
framework. Here Dooyeweerd with his wetsidee (law-idea), conception of  the 
57Ibid., 100.
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law-subject relationship, and explanation of  the subject-object and subject-
subject relations can be of  much value.
The modal laws, inherent to all creation,58 guarantee the possibility of  
the subject-object relation as both sides share the same laws. As such, the law 
of  God as revealed through Scripture makes interdependent creaturely being 
possible.59 There where within the temporal dimensionality of  Reason creation 
is understood as bound to the law, and the God who has independence status 
as subjecting himself  to these laws, knowledge and understanding do not start 
with the subject as if  knowledge has to bridge an original gulf  between God 
and the individual subject. There is no gap that needs to be bridged—on the 
contrary, knowledge presupposes that we are in a relationship already! This 
interpretation corresponds with naive experience: we experience coherence 
between ourselves and the world around us, even when two different subjects 
talk differently about the same object. The phenomenological structural 
relationship that exists between the knowing subject and the knowable object 
can, from a biblical perspective, be interpreted as a relationship, enabled by the 
subjection of  both subject and object to a common creational law-design.
As we have seen through the analysis of  the phenomenological structure 
of  Reason, all interpretation is done by the subject. In a biblical interpretation 
of  the structure of  Reason, the subject is subjected to creational norms and 
laws, according to which the trustworthiness and validity of  any interpretation 
and other acts can be judged. The creational law that all creation inherently 
shares and by which human beings live and think allows no ontological gap, but 
enables the existence of  justified and unjustified interpretations of  the object.
It is then the positive form of  living our religiosity, i.e., our trust in God 
expressed in positively answering his call to walk in his ways, which are the laws 
and norms to which all creation is bound, that allows for true relations with 
the world around us. The law as creational ontic and ethical order that binds 
the diversity of  creational diversity together makes, on one side, the subject-
object relation possible and has therefore a strong relational character, and 
functions, on the other side, as a call for responsible interpretation. This call 
cannot be ignored or resisted, since we live through and by this law. The only 
freedom human beings have in this regard is to either respond responsively 
or unresponsively as transgressing the law, i.e., the creational order that 
characterizes the universal structural datum. In both cases, humanity is subject 
to the law. The epistemic freedom of  human beings consists in the ability to 
rationally construct an ontology that stays in a dualism with the real creational 
order. Any rational construction needs to be assessed from the perspective of  
formal logic and from the perspective of  the structural datum, which both 
function as universal states of  affairs.
In such an interpretation of  the structural subject-object relation, 
knowledge is never a precise copy, as the object is temporal and always moving 
forward by its future extension. Knowledge is much more the creation of  a 
dynamic temporal relationship that receives the contributions of  both the 
58Wolters, 12-18.
59Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 100.
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subject and the object. This dynamic temporal relationship-by-law asks for 
doing justice to the normative side of  both object and subject. Knowledge 
is therefore never absolute, but it is not just a human projection either.60 I 
would like to clarify this by sharpening the definition of  Canale’s “lines of  
intelligibility.”
By implementing Dooyeweerd’s law structure in the interpretation of  
the different frameworks of  Reason, Canale’s term “lines of  intelligibility” 
could be clarified as data that come from the object’s temporal extension.61 I 
think that Canale’s “lines of  intelligibility” can be understood as the temporal 
lines that are drawn by the constant living under the law by responding either 
positively or negatively to it. These lines of  intelligibility represent the manner 
of  living out, and the attitude toward, the Creator’s call. This means that 
through the lines of  intelligibility the intentionality of  the free, responsible 
subject (and the object as well) appears constantly—in fact, there is no 
intentionality without the lines of  intelligibility. Such an interpretation would 
also correspond to Canale’s understanding that in the subject-object relation, 
the object can never be understood as just a “brute fact,” but as a reality from 
which temporal lines of  intelligibility flow to the cognitive subject.62 
Knowledge is, however, not only nonabsolute because of  the different 
individual possibilities of  responding to the law, but also because knowledge 
is always temporal and dynamic. Because subject and object are not static, but 
dynamically extended from past into future, knowledge is always increasing, 
deepened with the future extension of  the lines of  intelligibility. 
As the subject never has full access to the object in the subject-object 
encounter, it is in need of  continuing the subject-object relation. The 
knowledge of  God thus calls for an enduring covenant.
4.2.5 Understanding, Theoretical 
Thought, and Religion
In their interpretation of  thought/Reason, both Dooyeweerd and Canale 
make a distinction between naive and abstract thinking. For both of  them, 
thinking takes place within time. Canale’s thought is, however, not fully 
developed when it comes down to a more detailed understanding of  the 
difference between naive and theoretical thought. 
Contrary to Canale, Dooyeweerd’s distinction between theoretical and 
nontheoretical thought, in connection with his modal theory, is of  persuasive 
character. In fact, I think that Dooyeweerd has seen something that is typical 
for theoretical thought: the Gegenstand-relation. In regard to naive thinking, 
theoretical thinking is of  a crucially different character in terms of  both the 
object the “Gegenstand,” and the subject that applies the logical function of  
60H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 4 vols., vol. 2 (Lewiston, 
N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 390-391.
61Cf. Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.3.3.3.
62Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 396.
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thought in a specific abstract way.63 Clouser explains the Dooyeweerdian 
distinction in an accessible way.64 In naive thinking, the object’s properties 
(e.g., odor, size, actions) are never extracted or isolated from the objects 
themselves. As Clouser opines, “this level of  abstraction does not focus on a 
thing’s odor or size or whatnot to such a degree as to disrupt the continuity 
of  those properties with all the other properties of  the things that have them. 
At this level of  abstraction, a property, though distinguished and singled out, 
is still experienced as a characteristic of  the thing that exhibits it.”65 
Clouser calls this level of  abstraction the “lower level of  abstraction.” 
Contrary to the naive attitude of  thought, in the theoretical attitude of  
thought we intensify “the focus of  our attention to such a degree that we 
actually do isolate a property from whatever exhibits it, and thus focus our 
attention on the property itself.”66 Here we specify our subject-object relation 
in such a way that a Gegenstand-relation is established within the general 
subject-object relations. Clouser calls this level of  abstraction the “higher 
level of  abstraction.”
The Dooyeweerdian distinction between “abstract” and “pretheoretical” 
knowing can help to create more clarity on this topic in the further 
development of  the interpretation of  the structure of  Reason within the 
dimensionality of  biblical Reason. Nevertheless, whatever idea of  abstraction 
will be developed, it needs to be grounded in temporality through which an 
intentional dissolution of  temporal coherence will be incompatible to the 
understanding of  the Gegenstand.67
In Canale’s phenomenological analysis of  Reason, abstract or theoretical 
knowledge is understood as knowledge in which the system of  Knowledge 
(Reason’s frameworks) is technically made explicit so that it can become a 
foundation and tool for scientific and philosophic analysis. In pretheoretical 
knowledge, on the other hand, the system of  Knowledge remains implicit.68 
Pretheoretical and theoretical knowledge are different approaches to the 
structural datum. In the naive experience of  the structural datum, the 
interpretation of  the hermeneutical structure is used implicitly, while in the 
theoretical approach the interpretation of  the hermeneutical structure is much 
more explicit because of  the need for theoretical synthesis. The dimensionality 
of  Reason, however, often remains hidden in both ways of  knowing.
As I have shown, Canale’s biblical interpretation of  the structural 
difference between abstract and naive thought creates some confusion. 
On one hand, the abstract is reformulated as having a “promise character” 




67With the help of  the modal theory implanted into temporal Reason, theoretical 
thought could be understood as abstraction of  functions being found in the temporality 
of  creation instead of  timeless principles.
68Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.3.3.4.
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that is neither true nor wrong, as the temporal future-extension of  Being 
has not yet taken place.69 On the other hand, I would understand the lines 
of  intelligibility as being themselves of  an abstract character. The lines of  
intelligibility express only a limited part of  the object. This “part” refers to 
that which is made known as temporal-relative characteristic of  the temporal 
open object-identity. I suggest that the lines of  intelligibility are to be 
understood as the expression of  the subject’s and object’s individual historical 
responses (intentionality) to the creational laws and norms. In order to come 
to an understanding of  the object’s intentionality, the lines of  intelligibility 
need to be cognitively gathered by abstracting them in cognitive tension from 
the diversity of  a specific object-being in extended time.70 By means of  the 
temporal-relative characteristics (past lines of  intelligibility) of  a specific 
object, the future being of  that object is partly predictable as one gets access 
to its individual intentionality.
We see then that the word “abstract” has received two different meanings 
in Canale’s work: “promise character” and “lines of  intelligibility.” Since it is 
possible to see an interconnection between the lines of  intelligibility and the 
idea of  the promise character, I think a new definition of  the word “abstract” 
is possible without compromising either of  them. The understanding of  the 
received lines of  intelligibility is of  temporal-relative character and needs to 
be proven true or false, while the lines of  intelligibility extend with the object 
into the further future extension. On the basis of  the law-idea, I suggest that 
the lines of  intelligibility have, as an expression of  the intentionality of  an 
object, a promise character since they suggest how the intentionality of  the 
object will respond to the laws and norms, to which creation is subjected, in the 
future-extension. The lines of  intelligibility are thus meant as the expression 
of  contents and patterns the object reveals in its temporal extension, which 
requires the temporal openness of  the object as it extends further into the 
future. The further the lines of  intelligibility extend into the future, the more 
clearly is the individual intentionality of  any object revealed.
My suggestion is thus that the promise character should be understood as 
a characteristic of  the lines of  intelligibility. The lines of  intelligibility include 
a promise character. Consequently, “abstraction” refers to the cognitive 
gathering-tension of  the object’s temporal extension. 
Abstraction, therefore, belongs to any understanding, whether of  a 
theoretical or pretheoretical nature. The gathering process of  the lines of  
intelligibility is not only characteristic of  theoretical knowledge, but pertains 
to all human ways of  understanding. However, this abstraction process can 
be differently performed according to different thought-act-attitudes. Here 
I would like to integrate Clouser’s distinction of  high and low levels of  
abstraction. In the naive attitude, we abstract the object’s lines of  intelligibility 
in order to understand the object’s being in its temporal identity, by which we 
distinguish the particular object from all other objects. The temporal identity 
is characterized by the object’s specific way of  answering the divine call for 
69Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 379-380.
70Ibid., 374-382.
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living. In the theoretical attitude, we abstract the object’s lines of  intelligibility 
in order to understand the call to which creation in general needs to respond. 
In both attitudes, the human being involves himself  or herself  in abstraction. 
However, one can distinguish between different levels of  abstraction. 
Regarding science, it would make sense to see the highest form of  abstracting 
as the attempt to uncover the laws and norms by which creation lives and 
to which it needs to respond. These laws and norms are the ground of  the 
generation of  all lines of  intelligibility.
The Dooyeweerdian distinction between laws and norms can be helpful 
here. On one hand, the highly abstract involvement of  uncovering and 
understanding laws enables the most trustable predictions. On the other, 
some abstract involvement of  uncovering norms leads to less trustable 
guesses, since the free, responsible human subjects can respond differently to 
the call to live justly and creatively. Still, both norms and laws are temporally 
grounded, and our understanding of  them increases and changes, while the 
subject-object relations we are involved in extend to the future.
Having introduced the law-structure in the development of  interpreting 
Reason’s frameworks (see 4.2.4), the development of  a modal theory is 
made possible within the ontological framework of  temporal Reason. This 
development would help to make a clearer distinction between lower and 
higher levels of  cognitive abstraction. It would also show that especially in the 
theoretical attitude, there is the need for an explicit formulation of  Reason’s 
direction and setting for coherently interpreting our structural data as a 
process of  creating an image of  reality. In the theoretical attitude, the idea of  
origin (independence status) can no longer be found in the object (Gegenstand) 
or reality as given in experience, but must be sought in the subject and his self-
understanding as dependent on an understanding of  its own origin (theos).71
4.3 Conclusion
I conclude that a fruitful dialogue between the two thinkers is possible and that a 
further development of  Canale’s thought, especially concerning the interpretation 
of  the ontological framework, can be stimulated by use of  Dooyeweerdian 
concepts. When this is done, a tool for deconstructing biblical methodologies 
is made available, and a clear framework is laid out that inspires the scholar in 
general and the biblical theologian in particular to construct methodologies that 
do justice to the spirit and the data of  the biblical testimony.72 Only then are we 
enabled to realize the call of  Brueggeman: “our situation needs to be submitted 
to the text for a fresh discernment. It is our situation, not the text that requires 
71Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 89.
72Such a deconstruction of  exegetical methodologies on the basis of  a further 
development of  Canale’s thoughts has been performed in Oliver Glanz, “Who is 
Speaking? Who is Addressed?: A Critical Study into Conditions of  Exegetical Method 
and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of  Participant Reference-Shifts in the 
Book of  Jeremiah” (Ph.D. dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2010), 44-145.
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a new interpretation. . . . [T]his text subverts all our old readings of  reality and 
forces us to a new, dangerous, obedient reading.”73 
A clear understanding of  Reason’s phenomenology and a strong biblical 
interpretation of  this phenomenology will not only allow developing a better 
methodology for biblical theology, but it also will enable the many different 
disciplines (e.g., missiology, and systematic, biblical, pastoral, and aesthetical 
theologies) and subdisciplines of  theology to unite under one matrix and 
develop a diversity of  scholarly results that are compatible with each other, 
promoting unity and meaningful interdisciplinary dialogues. All disciplines of  
theology are called to engage seriously in methodological reflections if  the 
reputation of  our craft is to be saved.
73Walter Brueggemann, To Pluck Up, To Tear Down: A Commentary on the Book 
of  Jeremiah 1-25, ed. Frederick C. Holmgren and George A. F. Knight, International 
Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 17.
